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HELSINKI CITIZENS' ASSEMBLY

NEWSLETTER

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A BUMPY RIDE

An historical roller coaster is sweeping through Europe. We hardly have time to draw breath and to take in the momentous implications of one crisis when we find ourselves confronting a new crisis equally momentous. The Gulf War, the civil war in Yugoslavia, the exodus from Albania, the suppression of the Kurds in Turkey, and above all, the astonishing events in what now has to be called the former Soviet Union, have followed in quick succession.

How are we to make sense of what is happening and what should be the role of the HCA? How are we to preserve our commitment to the democratic integration of Europe in the face of apparently widespread economic and political disintegration? How are we to uphold the HCA's ideals of open, honest dialogue and debate, of international cooperation and reconciliation, political pluralism, peace and non-violence when passion, speed and action rule the current situation?

Despite the difficulties, the role of the HCA is all the more important. The direction of the roller coaster is not determined. This is one of those rare historical moments when it really is possible to influence events.

Our central dilemma is the issue of national self-determination and its relation to European integration. On the one hand, national movements have played a crucial role in uniting and mobilizing opposition to totalitarianism. The rediscovery of national identity can provide a basis for an active civil society. Independence and autonomy may represent a necessary precondition for voluntary forms of cooperation in Europe. On the other hand, national feelings can easily be manipulated, undermining democracy and giving rise to new exclusivisms, remilitarization and violence. Discrimination against minorities, the violation of human rights, the construction of new enemy images, the creation of national guards, and so on, can all constitute enormous obstacles to cooperation.

It is sometimes argued that Eastern Europe has to go through the stage of nation-building that Western Europe experienced in the nineteenth century. Yet copying the West has always been Eastern Europe's tragedy. Continued on page 3.

An Odd Coup

By Marina Pavlova-Silvanskaja

The failed coup in the Soviet Union will keep the minds of people in our country and abroad busy for a long time to come. It seems there are as many opinions on the coup as there are people. Therefore I'm expressing my own thoughts and do not pretend to represent anyone else.

The timing of the coup wasn't picked by accident: only one day was left before the signing of the new Union Treaty. The draft of the treaty, agreed upon by the presidents of the republics, was severely criticized by the democratic public, mainly due to the large number of vague formulations which could be interpreted differently and therefore provoke intensive political struggle in the future. Moreover, the draft didn't indicate how long the treaty would be valid. A treaty that is not limited by time could turn into an empty document, opening the way for the reanimation of the imperial habits of the past. For this reason, Russia quickly started preparing protocols to be attached to the text of the treaty in order to overcome the main failures in the draft. In the middle of August, it became clear that the Ukraine would most likely not sign the treaty. A new Union without the Ukraine would lose all its sense. A Union of Russia with the Muslim republics of Central Asia and Khazakstan would appear extremely odd from all points of view. Gorbachev's concessions in this situation obviously exceeded the limits that the Party leadership, the army, the KGB, and the military-industrial complex could tolerate.

So what actually happened? People are still asking this question today. Was it a coup or not? Everyone was astonished by the way it was carried out. All kinds of different explanations were going around, including suspicions that Gorbachev was directly or indirectly involved in the coup, executed in an agreement between him and the eight conspirators. Schevardnadze has hinted

in this direction. Gorbachev's political enemies tried to describe what happened as an intriguing joint game between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

The strangeness of the coup can be explained through its strategy. You could see on TV screens that the army had no ammunition. The guns were without bullets. The tanks were there more as a threat rather than to take any specific military action. International telephone and fax lines worked without problems unlike intergovernmental communication. No arrests were made; most likely the repression was supposed to come later on, in five or six days, when there would be a clear center of resistance. They thought the threatening and unsystematic movements of tanks in the capital and in several big cities would be a sufficient demonstration of force and that the mere threat of force and force of fear would play its role. The aim of the coup was a soft kind of change; the conspirators were unable to present to the society solutions that could resolve the critical economic situation and therefore they could not survive without foreign help.

They were planning to find ways to return Gorbachev, who is popular in the West, to power. A relatively small part of society actively resisted the coup, but that seemed to be sufficient to destroy it. The triumphant forces immediately felt their moral advantage and the total demoralization of their enemies which gave

A relatively small part of the society actively resisted the coup, but that seemed to be sufficient to destroy it.

them the power to destroy or weaken the main totalitarian structures--the Party, the reactionary generals and the military-industrial complex.

But the abrupt destabilization of the center and the subsequent disappearance of the formerly powerful party from the political arena accelerated the disintegration of the Union. The Baltic republics, Georgia and Moldavia have managed to leave quickly, before the splintering pieces of the imperium could crush them. The Party elite of the Central Asian republics hoped to save at least the rest of its former power. It became clear that it would be unlikely to save a federation or confederation and the most possible variant would be an association of independent states that cooperate with each other in the economic and military spheres. But it wasn't possible until now to stop the process of the disintegration of the formal state structures. It is continuing and now it is hard to say if it is possible to avoid the total disintegration of the Soviet Union into an unlimited number of nation states.

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Trying to follow the West's historical trajectory, whether in terms of industrialization or nation-building, has always been impossible precisely because the West has been there before and transformed the international environment, the circumstances in which these developments have to take place. In a world which is economically interdependent, in which wars have become devastatingly destructive, and in which environmental problems are global, does the nineteenth century concept of the nation state, protecting its territorial integrity, with national armies and national currencies, make sense?

This is not just a question for East Europeans. It also has to be asked in relation to the European Community. Is the European Community an embryo, super nation state, Western Europe, in the process of creating its own currency and its own army in order to protect its territory against violence and instability beyond its borders, e.g. Yugoslavia? Or can the European Community become a new kind of organization that is truly supranational, open to all Europeans, and yet does not replace multicultural autonomy and diversity with a European nationalism?

If we are to secure peace and democracy in Europe, then we have to be imaginative about new forms of political organizations. There have to be traditional

vertical territorially based political organisations to protect language and culture and ways of life. These might be municipal, national or regional governments. But they have to be supplemented by new international horizontal organizations like the European Community, the CSCE, or the Council of Europe, to regulate economic and ecological cooperation, to guarantee human rights, the rights of peoples and freedom of movement, and to provide common security. These organizations can only acquire real legitimacy through the existence of a horizontal civil society, a genuine transnational political culture.

The challenge for the HCA is to try to construct that political culture, to preserve shared human values against the onslaught of new fundamentalisms and particularisms, to discuss and develop creative ideas about Europe's future in a situation where there is little time for thought.

We plan to hold next year's Assembly at the end of March in Bratislava. Slovakia is a small European nation facing many of the complex problems experienced elsewhere in Europe. It is also the geographical centre of Europe. It will be the occasion to meet and debate these issues and to recharge our energies for the next bumpy ride.

Mary Kaldor, Co-Chair of the HCA

A diary of the *Coup*

The point of view of a private person, a Russian citizen of the Ukraine

By Natalia Belitser

August 19. Day one of the coup. Kiev, morning. On the telephone: "A military coup! Gorbachev is arrested!" Radio, TV total information blockade: foggy news about the state of emergency in the name of the new found power-holders (*or as they call themselves in their jargon-"gekachepe"*).

Toward noon everything about the event is clear, people find out about the standpoint of the

Russian leadership. RUCH, meeting in an extraordinary session since the morning, takes a clear position: unconditional condemnation of the anti-constitutional conspiracy, total support to the Russian President and the Russian government. The texts of the decree by Yeltsin and the appeal to the Russian people by Yeltsin, Silayev and Hisbulatov which were received by fax at 13:50 are immediately multiplied and distributed to all Ukrainian regions. They are distributed in the form of one document containing RUCH's statement and accompanied by Yeltsin's portrait.

The Regional Council of Peoples Deputies of Galitsia (*three regions in the Western Ukraine*) send a telegram to Yeltsin: "In this difficult hour we declare our total support for the actions of the President, parliament and gov-

vernment of Russia. In a moment when the horrifying threat of the reanimation of Stalinism is hanging over the processes of democratization and reforms in the country, we declare that Western Ukraine supports all measures taken by you in your stand against the party-police coup."

In Moscow the Ukrainian community and the Moscow support group of RUCH gather under national flags by the walls of the Russian parliament. The "Ukrainian Unit" takes responsibility for defending one of the sections of the White House (*they remain there for three days*).

August 20. The National Council, the oppositional minority in the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, meets in the morning. They fail to call an emergency

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session of the Ukrainian parliament.

Kravtschuk, the head of the parliament, avoids using his powers. Thanks to the efforts of the National Council, the 125 signatures of MP's necessary to hold an emergency session are gathered. The National Council virtually takes over the function of the parliament and maintains communication with other regions, giving political and juridical assessments of what is happening. Together with RUCH, it distributes the information through local and foreign journalists and organizes four press conferences. The parliamentary opposition, political parties and civic organizations all call for unconditional support for Yeltsin, democratic Russia and the Russian government. VOST, the republican strike committee, declares its readiness for a general strike. A coalition of all democratic forces call for an independent democratic Ukraine.

August 21. During the night, blood was shed on the streets of Moscow. Citizens of Kiev stay at the Square of Independence expressing their solidarity with the Muscovites. Surrounded by Militia units they listen to Radio Liberty the whole night. Early in the morning they light candles. The first flowers appear around a placard which reads "To those who fell on the night of August 21, from the Ukrainian people." At noon in the Square, Peter Bojko, a priest of the orthodox church, says a prayer for the victims. During the next few days, the Square is the site of people collecting piles of flowers, candles, icons, and money for the families of the dead. In the evenings, meetings of solidarity.


August 22. In the evening there is a massive meeting of deputies from the National Council, and leaders of the oppositional parties and civic movements. In all speeches people underline the

extraordinary role of the Russian people.

For the first time in the history of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, a big meeting shouts: "Glory to Russia! Glory to Russian democrats! Glory to Yeltsin! Yeltsin, Unity!" I can say without any exaggeration that Boris Nikolayevich has become a national hero for the Ukrainian people.

August 24. The extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine declares the Act of State Independence.

August 28. One week has passed since the collapse of the coup. In Kiev, there is a big



spontaneous meeting near the building of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine. The banners mainly call for the freedom and independence of the Ukraine although there are some anti-Muscovite and anti-Yeltsin ones. From "Boris you are wrong" (*this time in the hands of a well-known human rights activist from Helsinki 90*), to "No I can't go on. The wonderful memories of unity are still very fresh."

So what has happened during these seven days? Is it possible that the worst fears have been proven right, the fears that appeared among some people on the night of August 24 after the

declaration of independence? Is it possible that a special Junta has won in the "independent" Ukraine and we will wake up to find ourselves in a Communist National Park isolated from democracy which has won in Russia? No, none of this! The Communist Party of the Ukraine is banned, its buildings are closed and bank accounts are frozen. On August 25, all political prisoners are set free.

Human rights are given special attention. It has been stressed that in all decisions related to the Army, KGB, Interior Ministry, the Communist Party and others involved in the coup, nobody should be prosecuted for his or her political beliefs.

Representatives of democratic organizations in the Ukraine have held a meeting at which the following declaration was made: "Former communists, don't worry! We democrats are not going to follow in your steps! Nothing will threaten you or your families! All those who suddenly lost work because of the ban on the Ukrainian Communist Party will receive a monthly financial compensation!"

What has happened? What dark power has implanted mistrust and hostility between our peoples and trampled the young and tender sprouts of reconciliation and mutual understanding? There isn't actually any dark power. Not the sleeping "Ukrainian Nationalists" that have crawled out of their trenches. The Ukrainian democrats haven't suddenly turned into Russophobes, chauvinists, and separatists.

The reason for such a sudden and shocking change in public opinion lies in the grave political mistakes of the Russian and Union leadership. I will briefly mention just the main ones. Firstly, proposals to divide the main positions of the new Union based on nationality so that "only a

Russian can become a Prime Minister"! Secondly, the declaration of the presidential press centre about the possibility of territorial claims in the Ukraine. Thirdly, the TV speech of Gavriel Popov, the Mayor of Moscow who, not for the first time, played the losing card of worries about the Russian and the Russian-speaking population. And as always, the sudden appearance of a delegation of the Russian government in Kiev. The heroes of yesterday are received by a suspicious crowd. Sobchak, the Mayor of Leningrad, gives a speech which is interrupted by the whistles of a jeering crowd.

In just a few days, these events have caused a huge blow to the relationship between Russia and the Ukraine. Russian "democrats" are to blame for they seem to possess a sleeping beast of Russian superpower chauvinism. Today at the press conference, Ruskoi spoke angrily about the posters he saw which read "Russians out of the Ukraine! Better with the Communists than with Moscow!" Neither me nor my friends who were present at the mentioned meeting saw them but it's impossible to cast doubt over the words of such an honest brave man. Esteemed Vladimir Alexandrovitch! Sharing your anger I declare that nothing of this kind has happened till now! I appeal to you to finally understand why. I also want to draw the attention of Boris Yeltsin, "who is wrong again," together with that of the whole "President's Party," to the fact that we, the citizens of the multinational Ukraine, will have to live with the consequences of your miscalculated and careless moves. It will be hard and it will take a long time to recapture the positions we had only just achieved. Let's hope that this task won't be in vain. Especially if democratic Russia, in which I still believe, will help us with it. ■

Killing ground that belongs to everyone

by Neal Acherson

The Ukrainian nationalist was no wild-eyed figure in an embroidered house. He was one of those spruce young men who form the restless element at weekend conferences on foreign affairs. But he was arguing for a Ukrainian national army.

"Three weeks ago," he said, "I was talking to NATO people about security. They brought up scenarios like civil war in the Ukraine, disintegration, mass flight, none of them so far-fetched. A Ukrainian army would be a stabilizing factor. What would it do? Well it would protect the integrity of the Ukrainian state. For instance, it would act to crush the group in the Crimea which is trying unconstitutionally to secede from the Ukraine and join Russia..."

"...Who needs armies in the new Europe of cooperating regions in which the nation state has faded away?"

Gloom settled on the meeting. The Helsinki Citizens' Assembly was in Moscow debating nationalism in the Soviet Union. For the Western delegates there, veterans of peace movements and left-wing politics, this was just what they didn't want to hear. A Dutch man protested that nationalism cannot be identical with democracy: nationalism was always a fraud sold by a minority to a majority. And who needs armies in the new Europe of cooperating regions, in which the nation state has faded away? The Ukrainians and Byelorussians, the Armenians and Lithuanians, looked at him as if he were mad.

A few days later, eight stupid men launched a military *putsch* to save the Soviet Union from both nationalism and democracy. By that time, I was in the Crimea.

In the latest of its countless changes of ownership, Crimea is at present an autonomous republic within the Ukraine, whereas in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, the *coup d'etat* was condemned even by the communists, the Crimean Communist Party welcomed it and tried to enforce the junta's orders. No doubt this will be taken as further evidence of a plot to transfer the Crimea to Moscow's control.

But conventional nationalism does not work for the Crimea. To ask who it belongs to is like asking who owns the past, or the wind. Everybody has been here; everybody has left a trace of themselves in ruins or place-names or the rich gene-pool of the place. It consists of forested mountains which plunge vertically into the Black Sea and of grey-green steppe running away forever to the east and north. It has been the site where those who

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called themselves "civilized"--Greeks, Byzantines, Genoese--met those whom they called "barbarians"--Scythians, Khazars, Tatars. The colonists settled along the coast, while the nomads settled the steppe and traded with them. Russia only displaced the Tatar khans and annexed the whole Crimea in 1783.

Who now has a right to control the Crimea? First of all, the "center" has a claim. People talk daringly in Moscow about the "ex-Soviet Union." But there is still a powerful Black Sea Fleet, with its headquarters in the magnificent old naval city of Sevastopol, which weighs heavily in world strategy. Secondly the "Soviet people" have a stake: those millions of human beings from every republic who come to lie on the shingle and acquire that plain-chocolate Black Sea tan and recover from the bloodiness of Soviet life.

Then there are what you could call "the present occupants." Russian colonization began slowly, but by the eve of the 1917 revolution the Crimean Tatars were in a decided minority in the land which old British maps still called "Crimeantary." Their persecution by Stalin culminated in 1944 when the whole surviving Tatar population was deported to Central Asia for supposed collaboration with the Nazi occupiers. Their land and houses were given mostly to Ukrainian settlers. The Crimea itself, which had been briefly independent after 1917, was attached to Russia until Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukraine in 1954. Ukrainians are now the single biggest population group.

What about the rights of the dispossessed? In a dry flat-bottomed valley outside of Simferopol, groups of men and women are building shacks out of home-dried bricks and tin sheets. These are the vanguard of the returning Tatars, only in the last three years permitted to come "home" to the land their forefathers conquered 600 years ago. They are squatters. They are hated by the Ukrainians who now live in their cosy little houses, under vine arbours planted by Muslim Tatar ancestors. From time to time Tatars are beaten, even shot. In fact, they are not the only dispossessed: Stalin also deported hundreds of Crimean Greeks, but most of them - to the consternation of Athens - are now heading "home" to Greece.

And Russia claims, too. In the ruins of the Byzantine city of Kherson, at Sevastopol, I stood over a circular pit excavated in the ruins of a baptistery. In this pit, once a marble-stepped pool, Prince Vladimir of Kiev was baptized in the Byzantine rite just over a thousand years ago. At this spot, the Russians' official conversion to Christianity took place. Since then, Russians have felt sentimental and then possessive about the Crimea.

In the nineteenth century, nationalist intellectuals struck up a ridiculous chorus about how the Crimea was an ancient heartland of Russian civilization. (*British travellers in that period were shocked by the cultural gap between the backward Russian occupiers and the sophistication of the overthrown Tatar khanate, with its exquisite capital at Bakhchiseray*). Even this year, the Russian parliament tried to block the Ukraine's grant of semi-autonomy to the Crimea, because this was "ancient Russian territory."

But not just nationalists loved this place. The other Russian intellectuals, the great writers and the witnesses for freedom, also felt that the Crimea was theirs--felt it in a non-exclusive way, though, which rejoiced in the presence of Tatars and Armenians, Greeks and Jews. It would be hard to find a writer with no Crimean roots, from Pushkin to Tolstoy to Chekhov (*whose "Lady with a Little Dog" waxed the esplanade at Yalta*), or Marina Tsvetaeva who stayed with friends at the bohemian little resort of Kokebel, or Osip Mandelstam who translated Dante at Sary Krim, that haunting last ridge of hill above the infinity of steppe.

Poor Crimea! Because it is beautiful and fertile and Asia's balcony looking westwards, it has been a killing ground. Near Vladimir's baptistery hundreds of skeletons were found: victims of the Tatar storm. Russian troops under Catherine the Great slaughtered the Tatars. The Russian military cemetery above the harbour at Sevastopol holds over 100,000 Crimean War graves. After the 1917 revolution, the Tatars were decimated by Bolshevik terror, civil war and famine. Hitler intended to turn the Crimea into a Teutonic stud-farm and the SS started work by murdering the Jews and the Gypsies. When the Red Army reconquered the Crimea in April 1944, they hanged Tatars from every lamp-post in Simferopol, and perhaps a third of the Crimean Tatars perished during the deportations.

And now a nice young Ukrainian democrat thinks that the Crimea will serve as the first battlefield for a new Ukrainian army. Then young Russians will volunteer to save the shrine of Vladimir and the Tsar's summer palaces from the alien hands of Kiev. Then the Black Sea Fleet will split and fight itself, and the holiday resorts will be sacked, and the population will starve or try swimming to Turkey. Or is there a chance that the new democrats will recognize that the Crimea--if nowhere else in the "ex-Soviet Union"--belongs to everyone? ■

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Thoughts Inspired by the Diyarbakir Incident

In July, a local leader of the People's Labor Party in Diyarbakir was kidnapped from his apartment and later killed by people who claimed to be the police. At his funeral, a peaceful demonstration was violently suppressed by the police, resulting several deaths. The same day, the police killed 10 members of a radical Turkish group in Istanbul. Two weeks after these events, the Turkish military began their assault on Kurdish guerilla forces inside Iraq. Murat Belge from the Turkish HCA reflects on what these events mean for democracy in Turkey. This text was published in the Turkish press and signed by 95 people on the first day of Turkish military actions in Iraq.

The forces of progress in the West are preparing to step into a world in which ethnic divisions have long ceased to pose a problem, so that national characteristics contribute only marginally to the shaping of human identity. Europe is on the way to becoming a new kind of social formation where nation states will not be standing apart from one another, and where regional economic and cultural integration comprising segments of various nation states will gain in importance over the politically distinct mother units of the latter.

But while part of the world is committed to developing this kind of "21st century" modernity, our neck of the woods seems generally inclined to persist in "19th century" methods. And the kind of future that Turkey should forge for herself is closely related to this question of method. In today's world, **how** rather than **what** is to be done has acquired significance. Unlike what many of us, too, used to believe, the ends do not justify the means; on the contrary, the means utilized are capable of corrupting the ends sought, and it is just not possible to attain civilized ends through barbaric methods.

Among the many problems confronting Turkey on the threshold of the 21st century, what looms particularly large is the Kurdish question, which possesses many common features with other ethnic questions on a regional scale. Under the influence of various negative factors, the problem itself is assuming rather intractable forms at present, thereby also coming to pose a major obstacle in the democratization of Turkey. As such, it is the most urgent question the country faces. And the events of last July in Diyarbakir should have sounded a solemn warning bell indeed, raising the specter of an utterly retrogressive drift in Turkish society.

Although the Kurds were originally one of the two peoples that united to wage the War of Independence, over the years the tendency of the Republican history has been to sink their existence into ever deeper oblivion. Thus while the military takeover of the 70's saw fit to mete severe punishment to those who had dared to draw attention to the fact that Kurds, too, were part of this society, things became even worse in the 80's as the September coup made even uttering the word "Kurd" a crime. Through a whole series of such practices, the attitude of the Turkish state to the reality of the Kurdish existence has become far removed from what could legitimately be called "policy" in a democratic republic; it is rather as a military strategy that sounds before us. It is this military strategy that has been implemented through the 1980's and naturally, instead of solving it has deepened and exacerbated the problem.

Those who decide state policy in Turkey are set on a course of denying the existence and rights of the Kurdish population, and in the final analysis, this is playing into the hands of separatism. To be stubbornly denied recognition, to demand it and to encounter mindless repression in response, is bound to induce a mental state in which it becomes impossible to respond in any other manner.

The Kurdish question has assumed its present form and dimensions after and due to the military intervention of 1980. The decision to employ military methods in forcing the Kurds to live under constant repression (*and to intensify that military repression to the utmost*) was taken by the leaders of the 12 September coup. Today it is our entire society that is left to confront the adverse consequences of that decision, and it seems that far worse is to come if we cannot succeed in introducing significant changes. And yet there is no one around whom we can call to account.

For us to be "of Turkey" or "from Turkey" is more than enough, and to that end, being "Turkish" is not a requisite. It is imperative to move on to a set of circumstances where defining oneself as being "from Turkey" will have the effect of bringing inner peace and contentment to people. ■

In the last week of October the HCA is sending a delegation to Turkey to investigate the situation in Kurdistan. We see this delegation as a way of widening the discussion of the continuing human rights violations and ethnic conflicts in Turkey and providing support and publicity for democratic forces in the country.

War in Yugoslavia

The Caravan: Citizens for Peace

The Peace Caravan may be one of the HCA's most important projects yet. It has generated a tremendous amount of enthusiasm and debate all over Europe. It has spawned a great deal of local activity with people mobilizing both East and West: a bus from the Soviet Union and others coming from Hungary; charter flights from Spain and Italy; and buses from Germany, France, Corsica, Sweden, Denmark and Greece.

We chose the slogan Citizens' for Peace because the bringing of peace to this region cannot be achieved by politicians alone. Citizens' for Peace will bring a truly pan-European message to the citizens of all the republics and provinces of the region: "Peaceful solution through negotiation-stop the war!" The Peace Caravan will demonstrate that there is a feeling of civic responsibility, concern and support for the future of this area. The caravan will take two routes beginning in Trieste and Skopje on September 25, culminating in a peace gathering in Sarajevo on September 29.

During these four days, those participating in the peace caravan will be able to hear views from different republics and provinces and to show their support for local peace groups and initiatives.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, it seemed that the threat of armed conflict in Europe would be eliminated. This war presents a challenge to those forces who have been working for peace, democracy, human rights and the integration of Europe. The Peace Caravan is the beginning of a series of initiatives which we hope will contribute to a civic process of mediation; this will include monitoring missions and roundtables dedicated to a non-violent solution to the conflict and guaranteeing respect for individual and collective rights.

Within the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, there are many different views on the situation in Yugoslavia. However there is a consensus that we should not decide on a solution to the conflict, e.g. a loose federation or a break-up. We are committed to a peaceful and democratic process on the road to finding that solution. Below are some of these different views.

Disintegration of *Yugoslavia*, Integration of *Europe*

The Belgrade Meeting,
July 7, 1991

In the first days of the crisis in Yugoslavia, the HCA organized an emergency meeting of about 150 people in Belgrade. The meeting involved people from most of the republics of Yugoslavia, including Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo. In addition, participants came from all over Europe, including Russia, Estonia, Romania, Turkey, Germany, France, Britain, Italy,

Denmark, the Netherlands, and Hungary as well as the United States and Canada. Among the participants were Professor Ernest Gellner, Professor Koen Koch, Professor Bronislaw Geremek, Adam Michnik, Laszlo Rajk, and Milovan Djilas. The following are excerpts from some of the participants' speeches.

Milovan Djilas

The Yugoslav crisis is the most drastic example of a crisis which is spreading throughout Europe following the disintegration of communism. It is also shaking the Western countries and causing differences among them. The big whirlpool from the East has shaken Europe considerably.

Germany and Austria are not hiding their possible intentions to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states. At the same time, the fact that any kind of a unilateral secession would lead to a war, particularly to a war between Serbia and Croatia, is being overlooked. That war would not only be a war between the states, it would also be a religious war, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The radical groups, which are tolerated by the legal authorities, would cause massacres on a large scale. In such a state of general confusion, the internationalization of the conflict cannot be avoided, the uprising of Albanians in Kosovo would bring Albania into it, while the Muslim countries would assist Bosnia.

Communism in Yugoslavia has disintegrated, except for a few pockets left here and there in the country. Propaganda in Slovenia and Croatia, as well as in the Germanic countries, is trying to force upon the rest of the world the argument that what we have today in Yugoslavia is a conflict between communism and democracy, which is quite untrue. This resembles, very much, the time when Nazi Germany was leading a campaign against communism. The West fell into that trap, while the Third Reich, unhindered, spread to the East. Today, as in those days, anti-communism in its primitive form of

nationalism is actually serving to establish and increase extreme tendencies. Isn't the propaganda about the Ustasha in Croatia and the Chetniks in Serbia the best proof of that? This does not mean that these things do not exist, but they are not the main problem; the authoritarian regimes in all the republics are actually the problem. They rule by relying on nationalism and state ownership. They have submissive parliaments without any real opposition. They control the media. So what we have here is a conflict between the ruling nationalist elites.

As long as the present leadership stays in power in the Yugoslav republics, a way out will be difficult to find. One of the

*..what we have
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b e t w e e n
nationalist elites.*

possible democratic solutions is offered by the Gligorov-Izetbegovic platform, and/or the confederal form with certain bodies remaining central. This plan could get the backing of a considerable portion of the public, but it is not enough for the survival of Yugoslavia. As far as Slovenia is concerned, no one is against secession, but it has to be done peacefully. It is no longer a secret that certain forces in Germany and Austria are pushing Slovenia down this road. However, one should bear in mind that any unilateral act would upset the balance of power, both in Yugoslavia and in Europe. Therefore the secession of Slovenia may be a much smaller problem for Yugoslavia than for Europe.

Tone Anderlic

Slovenian Liberal Democratic Party

For us the armed conflict and war in Slovenia represent an attempt by the conservative forces to annul the right of people to decide their own fate in a democratic way. In a war many things develop much faster than originally planned. This is why foreign missions have to monitor the situation so that an agreement on Yugoslavia can be reached in less than three months.

There is absolutely no reason for an ethnic war on Slovenia's territory. There is no question of a conflict between the Serbs and the Slovenes, or the Croats and the Slovenes. This war is an adventure of the military establishment. It must be understood that every policy that seeks unilateral solutions, even if it is federal in character, is doomed to fail. Before the military intervention, Slovenia was positive and ready for talks on creating a confederation or a federation of sovereign states. Today there is far less positive feeling. The army has done more toward the secession than all the political factors in Slovenia.

Chances for building a liberal-democratic system in these parts are very slim as long as Yugoslavia remains as it is today. Ethnic conflicts will be hard to stop unless everybody starts thinking differently. We regret that in spite of the military aggression, things are spoken of in two different ways in Yugoslavia: on one side we have the language of force and on the other the language of peace. Ten days after the armed conflict, there is still no agreement whether the army's intervention was necessary or not. With the situation becoming international and the absence of

foreign supervision, it is hard to expect any kind of an agreement. Our party holds to the concept of demilitarization and we support this idea.

Adam Michnik

The authoritarian syndrome is characteristic not only of Yugoslavia. It can also be felt in Poland, Romania and Georgia. If Yugoslavia breaks up, this could result in a difficult situation in Europe and elsewhere. Something similar could happen in Czechoslovakia and Romania. Herodot's assumption about times that change themselves and people that change times is confirmed by some changes at the bottom of society. In the previous system, there was communism with a xenophobic face; now, there is anti-communism with a Bolshevik face. In Poland, the Catholic Church was a progressive force. Now the Catholic Church is a political group with populist and authoritarian tendencies. Therefore, I ask myself, if the predictions of the 19th century poets were realized, would we leave humanism and turn to beastiality? The Poles know why the Slovenes want to secede and they have a right to a state of their own. Yet arguments in favor of the preservation of Yugoslavia are also strong. Throughout its 70 year history, Yugoslavia has been a key to peace and stability in the Balkans and Europe.

Mladen Lazic

Social Democratic League of Croatia

The independent state of Croatia, installed by the Ustasha movement during WWII, embraced the territories of Croatia, Bosnia

and Herzogovina, and part of Vojvodina. Initially the majority of the Croatian population accepted this state as the realization of a "thousand year dream" of "independence." The realization of such dreams began with the killing of thousands of Serbs. The retaliation of the Serbs started very soon, organized by the Chetniks. Both during and after the war, hundreds of thousands were killed on both sides. After the war, the ruling Communist Party led a policy of "pacification" of national relations, based on denial of the ugly facts of the national war. Ustashas and Chetniks were equally accused. This suppression of the past (*instead of openly and consciously overcoming it*) was accepted willingly and unwillingly by all sides, intellectuals included. Every effort to analyze national relations was proclaimed scandalous. The dissolution of centralized real Socialism has been led by forces which exchanged a collectivist ideology for a nationalistic one. This "recipe" is now implemented in all Yugoslav republics and has proved "successful" for the first time in Serbia. There the real problem, the constitution of the Serbian state, was "solved" by forceful means and a massive mobilization of the population. The opposition in Croatia took over the "recipe" before the elections. At the first National Assembly of the Croatian Democratic Union, Tadjman re-invoked the formula of an independent Croatia as "an expression of a 1,000 year will of the Croatian people for its own state." The Serbs responded by first voting for the Croatian Communists, but then turning to nationalism by supporting the Serbian Democratic Party. Protagonists of moderate alternatives are pushed to marginal position. ■

The Gaze of Fascism

By Tomaz Mastnak

The Yugoslav crisis is a highly complicated one. Its history is extremely complex and conflicts in the constitutive republics and autonomous regions vary. There are irreconcilable interests at work. If a common interest exists, there is no political will anywhere in the country to pursue it. What has proved even more fatal is the fact that we face conflicting perceptions of reality. All are distorted and mutually exclusive, highly emotional and untranslatable into any form of rational communication. They are playing the role of "objective interests." There is no single truth and no single solution to the crisis.

The immediate situation is as transparent as it could be. Serbia and the remnants of the Yugoslav federal army are fighting a war against Croatia. This is in no way a war for human rights, rights of minorities, or local autonomy. This is a war for territory. The war is taking place on Croatian territory, for Croatian territory. Croatia is defending its territory. Serbia's goal is a "Greater Serbia", a state which would encompass all the "soil" on which Serbs live today or have lived in the past. The Yugoslav army is assisting Serbia and executing Milosevic's plans partly because it shares them and because a "Greater Serbia" would be a state strong enough to maintain this army which is hated by all other Yugoslav peoples. This is an extremely dirty and destructive war. A number of Croatian villages have been raised

to the ground, villagers massacred and even dead bodies mutilated. Croatian towns are being bombed every day. Hospitals and churches seem to be privileged targets. The only parallel with the conduct of the Yugoslav army in Croatia is that of Franco's army in the Spanish civil war.

These are facts, empirically observable facts. Even an Englishman or woman should not have difficulties stating them. Consequently if the war in Yugoslavia is to be stopped, Serbia must be pushed back; the Yugoslav army must not only return to its barracks but withdraw from Croatia and the internal Yugoslav borders remain unchanged. At that point, political negotiations could start. As far as I'm concerned, everything is then up for discussion. Key issues would be the disarming of paramilitaries and dissolution of the Yugoslav army--the only stateless army in Europe, a gang of criminals among an undetermined number of other armed gangs.

I am aware I am taking an anti-Serbian position yet this is the only, at least relatively consistent, anti-war position I can imagine. There is no symmetry between Serbia and Croatia in this war; they are in anything but an equal position. To condemn all violence is therefore fallacious: it means siding with the aggressor. Croatia is the victim of aggression and urgently needs help. To deny it the right to defend itself is cynical and immoral.

I am talking about the war and about how to possibly stop it. There are too many people, however, I think, who refuse to talk about the war and are looking for ways to avoid facing it. They prefer to talk politics: to discuss who was historically responsible for the Yugoslav crisis, which Yugoslav republic is more totalitarian or democratic, or what is the future of Yugoslavia. Most often they succeed in suppressing a factual analysis with a parade of their political desires, *idees fixes* and good intentions. Yet to talk politics while the war is raging means, on the one hand, to pursue one's political interests in war and, on the other, to build war into politics. One is free to do it, yet one should then not pretend one is working for peace while one is politically involved in war. Doing it, one concedes that war is an extension of politics and politics a continuation of war. In this way, one is preserving war for post-war politics. In my view, this is unsound and self-defeating.

I understand war not only as a failure but as a straightforward breakdown and disruption of politics. I am all for politics, yet in the given case politics should first be restored. In order to achieve this, the war has to be stopped. This cannot happen without any political activity, yet the sole aim of this activity should be to stop the war. I am arguing for political minimalism, for a self-limited politics, restraining itself from offering any

solution to the Yugoslav crisis and any vision of its future development (*if there will be any*).

Finally I would like to address an excuse for not condemning Serbia and the Yugoslav army which has gained some currency. Serbian propaganda has promoted a view that Croatia is a fascist state, which should justify the war against it. The pre-war policy of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union undoubtedly was unreasonable and mistaken, and Croatia was not a model of democracy. Croatians seem to be growing aware of this. Trustworthy journalists report that Croatian soldiers on the front-lines now analyze what went wrong and discuss human rights and separation of military and civilian power. It is a strange subject to discuss in beleaguered towns and a promising sign. Be it as it is, Croatia was not, and is not, a fascist state.

Serbian people have also accused Mr. Genscher and Germany of being fascist because they expressed some critical views of Serbia. In Belgrade the Pope who called for a prayer for peace in Croatia was also publicly and aggressively denounced as a fascist and the Vatican declared a fascist state. One could simply apply the old Hegelian saying about the gaze and the evil of Serbia, its authorities and its people (*by "people" I mean a political category, not the Serbian population*). Fascism is in the gaze which sees it. If there is a fascist state in Yugoslavia, it is Serbia with its clear cut *Blut und Boden* ideology, its authoritarian regime, total control of the ruling party over the media, the cult of the leader and expansionist, imperialist policy.

European diplomacy which so much contributed to the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, is now failing to appease it. The EC's political efforts are, in the northern parts of this country, if not generally, observed with an ever growing disappointment and distrust. People here are astonished. They cannot figure out whether it is a total lack of understanding, an incredible incompetence, ill will or a secret agenda (*a plan to reconstruct Yugoslavia which has some time ago ceased to exist?*) which makes European diplomacy so hopeless. A Slovene independent weekly, *Mladina*, put it aptly saying that the statements on Yugoslavia made in the last two months by EC diplomats would fill an encyclopedia of political idiotism. There is speculation as to how long will we have to wait for Mr. van den Broek to nominate Milosevic for the Nobel Peace Prize. To make things worse, the non-governmental policy has failed too. It is sadly following in the footsteps of the established big brothers only it lacks the bizarre glamour of the latter.

In our next issue, Mient Jan Faber will defend the Dutch Foreign Minister.

CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension in Moscow

The HCA's Human Rights Commission, now headed by Antonio Papisca from University of Padua, presented a document to the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension in Moscow in September. The document demands greater participation of NGO's in the decision-making process of international organizations and respect for political pluralism. The document also demands the right to desert in a civil war and the right to self-determination on the basis of non-violence and respect for minorities.

Workshop on Reproductive Rights in East and Central Europe

The Women's Commission is organizing a workshop focusing on reproductive rights in East and Central Europe. Tentatively set for December 7-8 in Prague, pending funding, the workshop will bring together women East and West to discuss how to respond to new legislation and changes in the healthcare system which affect women's reproductive rights.

The need for such a workshop became clear from the events of the past year. In Poland, there have been well-known challenges to the law on abortion while the price of contraception has nearly tripled. In Czechoslovakia, a new law on abortion is

Projects and Activities

being prepared which would increase the price to the equivalent of an average monthly salary. Meanwhile independent women's groups are emerging to respond to these challenges. The workshop aims to develop concrete ways to address all the issues related to reproductive rights, including healthcare, contraception and sex education.

Conversion Seminar

To be held jointly with the Institute for East-West Security Studies in Prague during the first week of December, this seminar will discuss ways of establishing a mechanism for providing technical assistance and finance for the conversion of arms industries both East and West. Events in the Soviet Union have highlighted the need to fund conversion. Yet there has been very little discussion of how to assist conversion. This seminar will bring together representatives of international donor institutions, trade unions, arms industries and local defense-dependent communities to discuss the appropriate forms of assistance and the appropriate recipients for assistance, e.g. communities or companies.

International Network for Democratic Solidarity

Initiated by the Czech HCA, this Network held its first meeting in August. The decay and collapse of totalitarian regimes in Central Europe and the USSR caused an explosion of democratic feelings and movements. But the struggle for democracy is not yet over. The roots of totalitarianism are deep and there is a danger of losing or distorting the fundamental values and priorities of our revolutions. In the 70's and 80's, democratic opposition in our countries were united by their democratic, liberal and social values. These values can be threatened again, both by old and new anti-democratic forces as well as by public apathy. Our initiative is based on our common anti-totalitarian struggle, on the post-revolutionary experience and on the similarity of problems we all face.

Our initiative is a response to the growth of right-wing demagogy, authoritarian tendencies, closed societies, intolerance, including racism, and the power of old and new political monopolies. Our Network follows in the direction of the Social and Liberal Forum which

emerged in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. More detailed projects will be elaborated at our first major meeting in Prague in late November this year.

Economic Democracy

Within the Economy and Ecology Commission, we are initiating a citizens' investigation into the privatization programs in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We have begun consulting citizens' organizations in Czechoslovakia concerned with privatization to develop the idea in response to their needs. The response has been enthusiastic.

Our first citizens' investigation will be with the Czechoslovak Metalworkers Union who have given general backing to the project. In January we will begin working with them to assess how privatization is affecting their members. We have also had a positive response from the Civic Movement led by Jiri Dienstbier. We are exploring with them how we might work together to organize citizens' hearings in different localities. We are also planning another pilot hearing in early 1992 with the Agricultural Union at a medium size cooperative near Prague. And lastly, we are establishing a close relationship with the Central European University in Prague which is interested in cooperation.

National Committee Updates

Slovakia

by Jana Hermanova

The HCA in the Slovak Republic was established last June at a general meeting of independent citizens who are involved in non-governmental movements and organizations in Slovakia. The Slovak HCA has 28 members which elected a nine member presidium. A smaller leadership committee, consisting of three people, was also formed. Approximately 25 civic organizations are represented in the Slovak National Committee.

The problems of economy and ecology and of social and national relations in this part of Europe are presenting a real threat to the emergence of a democratic society. The potential of the democratic changes may appear insufficient. In this context, the HCA in the Slovak republic considers its main task to activate the citizens of Slovakia to strengthen the democratic system. The first statements and activities of the HCA in Slovakia responded to these issues. Meanwhile working groups are being created around issues of nationalism and federalism, conversion of the military industry and regional cooperation.

Greece

by George Papandreou

The Greek National Committee meets every month and consists of roughly 25 members, associating women's organizations, ecological groups, trade unions and intellectuals. Our main priority is developing a Balkan counterpart to the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly-a Balkan Citizens' Assembly. At the founding Assembly, we discussed convening a Balkan conference of NGO's. Since then, we have been in contact with our Bulgarian counterpart, and lately we have discussed this project with Murat Belge, our Turkish counterpart, who has agreed to call an "organizational" meeting of representatives from the Balkan countries. In general there is a weak fabric of NGO's in the Balkan countries due to the authoritarian regimes that


have existed for so many years. We are called to develop such structures from the bottom up. A Balkan conference would not only be a forum for discussing the problems facing the Balkans but would focus on strengthening non-governmental structures. Athens is celebrating its 2,500 anniversary of the establishment of democracy this fall. The term "democracy" has gained renewed vigor in recent years. It nevertheless remains a term to be identified, understood and applied in new and innovative ways. We would like to utilize this anniversary in a positive way not only for our Balkan initiatives but also to stimulate discussion on strengthening democratic institutions in Europe. Greece is a member of the EEC and considered "western". Its orthodox tradition however links it to

other cultures, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Russia and Yugoslavia, which have been part of the Eastern bloc for decades. The Greek National Committee hopes that its efforts to organize a Balkan Citizens' Assembly will have tangible results in furthering cooperation, communication and understanding among Balkan peoples.

Corsica

by Jean Pierre Olivési

The Corsican HCA was initiated by an appeal titled "Corsican, European Citizens" which was distributed together with the 1990 Prague Appeal. Some of the problems we face are due to the importance of the national question. We would like to promote democratic and non-violent ways of resolving **cont. on-pg. 14**



political questions with the help of a new participatory citizenry.

Together with the Anti-Racist Corsican Movement (AVA BASTA), the Corsican Committee took part in the organization of an international colloquium called: "Is Nationalism Liberation or Oppression?" National recognition is at the present time one of the main Corsican political questions. The phrase "Corsican people" has been suppressed by the new law on the legal statute of the Island by the French "Conseil Constitutionnel" (Supreme Court). The meeting was a success, with over 40 participants from numerous countries.

We also took part in the Mediterranean Citizens' Dialogue in Grenada in April. We are currently working with the French HCA committee to organize a similar forum on the Mediterranean Peace Process in Paris in February. Our other activities include preparing Corsican participation in the Peace Caravan in Yugoslavia and organizing an international meeting on culture in Corsica in November.

The HCA's role in Corsica is to present an international humanist view of politics and to work for the recognition of rights of citizens and people.

Estonia

by Ulo Laanoja

The most important issue for Estonia now are

negotiations with the government of the Soviet Union to resolve problems between the two new states. On an international level, Estonia faces challenges in restoring its place in the international community. Acceptance to the United Nations was a positive first step. Economic problems are also proving to be a central issue. In the next two years, we will witness a more rapid transformation of economic structures with privatization and reform. There have also been proposals to the European Community and the Council of Europe to develop projects to link the Baltics with the European Community.

This also involves a parallel process of connecting civil society. Unfortunately, civil movements in Estonia will probably be very weak for the next two years. After the very active years of '88/'89, most people have found their place in official political structures while another sector of society is in business. The problems of everyday life and making ends meet has meant little time for activity on the level of civil society. However, in many ways, the aims of official political structures are the same as the aims of civil society in Estonia; political parties in our case are in some cases representing civil society. The Estonian HCA has members coming from different political parties, organizations and movements. Some of these members are also in leadership positions of

political organizations. We work closely with about six organizations, including green and women's organizations. We have appointed people to commissions and/or projects to facilitate cooperation with the Estonian committee. We hope that in this way the international HCA can help us in making the first steps towards integrating into the European Community. ■

Odd-Coup

continued-from-page2

The failed coup provoked controversial social processes in the republics. On the one hand, opposition to the totalitarian and authoritarian local powers was activated, as in Georgia and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the features of authoritarianism in Russia were clearly crystallized. With its resistance to the coup, the democratic society in the main Russian cities demonstrated its ability to organize itself. But democratic forces weren't strong and stable enough to be able to create structures of civil society capable of surviving. The main center of the democratic forces in the critical days were not the civic movements and not even political parties but the state institutions of Russia, its President, government and parliament. Meanwhile we can see the enormous intensification of authoritarian trends in the society. There are various

trends but all of them are authoritarian. In Russia, irrespective of democratic procedures, there are moves to crush the Communist Party, its property and press, down to the last member. People see a very nasty process of politicians fighting for one cake-the cake of power. We can see open disputes for party and state property. In a very short time, new political elites have emerged.

In the years of perestroika, the idea of a law governed state became so deeply rooted that the attempts by the Russian powers to take full advantage of the defeat of their political enemies through semi-illegal or even illegal means was met with solid criticism in the mass media and from the growing layer of entrepreneurs who are rapidly creating their own organizations. But the democratic forces have not until now shown a similar trend towards unity. There are no strong trade unions in the country that are capable of defending the interests of the workers. Among the democratic political parties, unions which could make it possible to work efficiently in the parliament are being created very slowly and painstakingly. For these reasons, the approaching process of transition to a market economy may be very difficult indeed and could lead to a reemergence of social and political instability and even local explosions. ■

CSCE Expert Meeting on National Minorities in Geneva, July 1991

by Stella Jegher

At the CSCE Expert Meeting on National Minorities, held in Geneva in July, the Swiss HCA Committee tried to organize a coordinated presence of some HCA delegates. Organizing HCA representation was difficult for several reasons. First, it was unclear what we could do there and what kind of influence NGO's would have. Secondly, the situation in Yugoslavia weighed heavily on all of us during this time. Lastly, nobody imagined that big steps forward could be taken at such a conference. Indeed, the conference ended with almost no concrete results. No "mechanism" to ensure control and protection of minority rights was formulated and the fear of losing national unity blocked all concrete measures. Furthermore, there was a lack of participation by minorities themselves.

On the other hand, the meeting was a good experience because we were able to assess the opportunities for NGO's to be involved in such discussions. About 70 NGO's representing a wide range of perspectives from the Crimean Tatar Movement to the Bund der Vertriebenen, from the Jewish World Congress to the European Conference of Churches were present. With the official NGO badge delivered without problems, one had access to the plenary meetings, to the "corridors," and to a special room for NGO's inside the conference center. An NGO Bureau, set up by the



Geneva-based International Service for Human Rights, coordinated meetings, exchanges of views, brainstorming and presentations by governmental delegations. The role of the Bureau was of great importance; without their activities, almost completely done by volunteers, much less work would have been possible.

The first days of NGO activities were dedicated to discussing and voting on a common memorandum which made several demands dealing with improving cooperation between NGOs and delegates at CSCE conferences. This was in compliance with the paragraph in the Paris Charter which says that "nongovernmental organizations, groups and individuals...must be involved in an appropriate way in the activities and new structures of the CSCE in order to fulfil their important tasks." For the HCA, this memorandum may become quite important for effectively carrying out our work related to the CSCE process.

One of the guests in the NGO conference room was Mr. Eliasson, director of the CSCE Secretariat in Prague. He told us a little about the tasks of the Secretariat and spoke about the

CSCE Parliamentary Assembly which will have its first session in July 1992. He did not hide his view that this Assembly is more a symbolic rather than a really democratic institution. Concerning the CSCE process as such, Mr Eliasson thinks the basis of the CSCE is endangered by the centrifugal forces who would like to separate economic, military and human rights issues and deal with them in other institutional frameworks, such as the EC, West European Union and the Council of Europe.

WRITE US!

In our next issue, we would like to publish letters to the HCA

HCA CALENDAR

- October 1 Public Meeting on Nationalism and self-determination, London, organized by European Dialogue
- October 5-6 Conference on basic principles of national security of sovereign states, Kiev, organized by Ukrainian Republican Party, Greens, Helsinki 90 and the Ukrainian HCA.
- October 30-
November 1 International Conference on the Arms Trade, New York, organized by SANE/Freeze
- November 9-10 Arms Trade Seminar, Bratislava, organized by the European Arms Trade Network
- November 13-17 Conflict Resolution, national identity and European integrity, Schlaining, Austria, organized by the Culture of Peace and Non-Violence, Ljubljana
- November 27-30 Building a Europe with frontiers; the role of women, Athens, organized by the Mediterranean Women's Studies Institute
- November 28-
December 2 Meeting of the International Network for Democratic Solidarity, Prague, organized by the Czech HCA and others
- December 9-11 Meeting of the HCA Human Rights Commission, Padua
- February 7-9 Meeting of Citizens of the Mediterranean, Paris, organized by the French HCA and others

To receive HCA mailings, including our newsletter, we would welcome a minimum contribution of \$20/DM30, from Western Europe, the US and Canada.

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